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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

MICHAEL C. MARTIN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070426-CA

:

Pursuant to this Court's directive, Defendant/Appellant Michael Martin has
addressed the Court's jurisdiction on appeal, and he has raised an issue concerning the
plea-in-abeyance agreement. (Br. of Appellant, dated May 14, 2008). Now he files this
reply brief to answer matters set forth in the State's brief. See_ Utah R. App. P. 24(c)
(2008). The issues before this Court may be decided on the record and existing law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE'S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION DISREGARDS THE
LAW.
In papers filed with this Court, the State originally agreed that the Court had
jurisdiction over Martin's appeal. (See "State's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for
Summary Disposition/' dated August 275 2007).
Indeed, according to the record, on April 20, 2007, the trial court entered a
judgment of conviction on two counts. (R. 131-33). The judgment for count one was in
error since the parties had agreed in September 2005 to dismiss that count. (See, e.g., R.
51-58 (reflecting September 2005 agreement to dismiss count one)). The judgment for
1

count two was for "Criminal Mischief- Class A Misdemeanor." (R. 131-33). When the
trial court realized its error in the judgment as it related to count one, it issued a postjudgment Memorandum Decision. (R. 136-39 (dated May 8, 2007)). The Memorandum
Decision addressed the April 20th judgment in three respects.
First, it vacated the sentence and conviction on count one. (R. 138). The State
does not dispute that point. It has recognized in its brief on appeal that nothing more is
necessary to resolve count one. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellee, 12). Thus, count one is fully
and finally concluded.
Second, the Memorandum Decision reiterated that the trial court intended to enter
a judgment of conviction for a class A misdemeanor offense on count two. (R. 138). Yet
the April 20th judgment already supported a conviction on that count. (See R. 131-32
(entry of judgment and conviction for criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor on count
two); 138 (Memorandum Decision for criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor on
count two)).
Thus, the Memorandum Decision did not change the substance or character of the
original judgment for count two. The State does not dispute that point. In fact, the State
asserts that "[t]he signed sentence, judgment, and commitment of April 20th plainly
documents count [two] as a class A misdemeanor with a suspended 365-day jail term.
Moreover, the court had already explained both its intent and rationale for the reduction
at the March 9th hearing. The clarification that the court offered in its May 8th
memorandum decision was thus mere surplusage. It did not add, subtract, or even clarify
what was already plainly on the record" (Br. of Appellee, 10) (emphasis added; internal
2

cites omitted). That is correct: the trial court's Memorandum Decision had no effect on
the conviction for count two and the suspended jail sentence with probation. (See Br. of
Appellee, 10).
That portion of the Memorandum Decision is treated as a nunc pro tunc entry. See
State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, Tf 11, 106 P.3d 729. It relates back to the date of the original
April 20th judgment of conviction on count two. See, id_ (stating when a later order does
not change the substance or character of the original judgment, it is "merely a nunc pro
tunc entry which relates back to the time the original judgment was entered") (cite
omitted); (see also R. 131-33). Thus, under the circumstances, Martin was required to
perfect his appeal by filing a notice of appeal on or before Monday, May 21, 2007. See
Utah R. App. P. 3, 4, 22 (2008) (requiring appeal to be perfected within 30 days of
judgment). He did that. (See R. 141 (notice, dated May 21, 2007)). His appeal was
timely. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point LB.).
Notwithstanding Martin's filing, the State seems to claim that this Court lacks
jurisdiction over the appeal because of the third issue addressed in the Memorandum
Decision: restitution. (See Br. of Appellee, 12). Specifically, in the Memorandum
Decision, the trial court ruled that on April 20th it neglected to consider statutory factors
under the restitution act. (R. 138-39). Thus, it entered the Memorandum Decision to
reopen proceedings on that issue. (Id.)
Under Utah law, a trial court may address and resolve the issue of restitution after
entry of the original judgment of conviction. The Utah Supreme Court ruled, "[W]here
orders for restitution remain open to be decided at a later date, the subsequent entry of the
3

amount of restitution is not a new and final judgment for purposes of appealing the
underlying merits of a criminal conviction." Garner, 2005 UT 6, | 17. Accordingly, if
the issue of restitution is reopened for consideration at a later date - as happened here
with the Memorandum Decision (R. 138-39) - that does not affect the time for filing an
appeal. Garner, 2005 UT 6, If 17. Stated another way, the appeal from the judgment of
conviction will not wait for finality on restitution. I(L atfflf15-17. Consequently, if a
defendant delays in filing the notice of appeal until after the trial court has addressed
restitution in sentencing, the appeal will be too late. See, e.g., id. at^f 1-6, 15-17.
In earlier papers filed with this Court, the State agreed with the supreme court's
ruling in Garner. It stated,
[T]he district judge lacked jurisdiction to set aside a valid sentence at that point,
and his anticipated review of the restitution issue did not affect the finality of the
judgment and sentence for purposes of appeal. Before considering the restitution
issue, the district court judge had corrected the sentencing errors, leaving a valid
conviction and sentence for a class A misdemeanor.
("State's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition," at 7 (citing Garner,
2005 UT 6, Tj 17; State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^ 10, 84 P.3d 854 (upon
imposition of a valid sentence, the court loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case))).
Now on appeal, the State has reversed its position. It maintains this Court should
deny jurisdiction over the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to "consider restitution, as mandated by the Crime Victims Restitution Act. When the district court enters
its amended final judgment, sentence, and commitment, defendant's time for filing an
appeal will commence." (Br. of Appellee, 12). The State's argument is contrary to
Garner. Indeed, it makes no mention of Garner in its treatment of the issue. (Id.)
4

The State's new argument should be rejected. The trial court's reference in the
Memorandum Decision to restitution "does not affect" the finality of the conviction and
judgment for purposes of appeal. (See "State's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for
Summary Disposition," at 5 (citing Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 17)). Thus, where Martin filed
a notice of appeal within 30 days from the original judgment of conviction on the class A
misdemeanor offense, the appeal from the conviction is timely and proper.
POINT II. THE STATE RELIES ON SUBSEQUENT HEARINGS TO
CLAIM THAT MARTIN VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT. YET
THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS ARE IRRELEVANT.
In September 2005, Martin and the State entered into a plea-in-abeyance agreement, whereby Martin agreed to replace a fence and foliage in his neighbor's yard, and he
agreed "to have the work done by a licensed third party." (R. 55; 51-58). In July 2006,
the State filed an order to show cause, alleging Martin was in violation of the agreement.
(R. 108-110). Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. (R. 197).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Martin violated the
agreement because he assisted the third-party contractor in doing the work, and he was
not supervised at all times. (See R. 197:55-56). Martin maintains on appeal that the pleain-abeyance agreement was not so restrictive as to prohibit him from assisting with the
work and it did not require that all work be done exclusively and solely by the third-party
contractor. (See Br. of Appellant, Argument, Point II.) Thus, based on this record he did
not violate the terms of the agreement.
Under the law for plea-in-abeyance agreements, a trial court must ensure that the
terms and conditions are explicit and unambiguous. See_ United States v. Burns, 160 F.3d
5

825 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (recognizing that significant terms should be stated "explicitly and
unambiguously" in the agreement to preclude subsequent circumvention); see also State
v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, \ 19, 69 P.3d 838 (stating "'[a]ny omissions or ambiguities
in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised
in the course of the plea colloquy'") (cite omitted). They must be detailed and in writing.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-2(4) (setting forth requirements for plea-in-abeyance agreement); 77-2a-l(l) (2003) (indicating conditions are "as set forth" in the plea agreement).
If the trial court intends the agreement to be restrictive, the court must specify the
terms at the time of the plea hearing. See, e.g., id_ at §§ 77-2a-2(4) (requiring "full,
detailed recitation" of requirements and conditions of the agreement), 77-2a-l (defining
plea-in-abeyance agreement to set forth "specific terms and conditions"). If the
agreement fails to set out the restrictive terms, such terms may not be imposed against the
defendant after the fact. See, e.g. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)
(stating "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is
entered") (emphasis added). In addition, if the terms are ambiguous, they must be
construed against the government and in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., United States
v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312
F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2002); InreAltro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999). If the terms
are reasonably disputed and the record fails to support a meeting of the minds, the parties
may be put back into their original pre-plea positions. See, e.g., State v. Bickley, 2002
UT App 342,ffif15-16, 60 P.3d 582.
6

The State does not dispute the law on plea-in-abeyance agreements as set forth in
Martin's brief. (See Br. of Appellee, Argument II.; see also Br. of Appellant, Argument,
Point II.) Likewise, it does not dispute that the trial court found Martin to be in violation
of the agreement on the grounds that he assisted the third-party contractor with the work.
However, the State claims the trial court was correct in that ruling because Martin "was
not to have any part in completing the repair work." (Br. of Appellee, 17).
Yet in connection with its claim, the State has looked not to the plea agreement
but chiefly to subsequent hearings in the trial court in January 2006, February 2006 and
January 2007 (Br. of Appellee, 14, 16, 17); and letters from the complaining neighbor,
Kathryn Randazzo, filed after the plea hearing (id., 16). The State relies on the
subsequent proceedings as a "key to understanding" the trial court's ruling. (Br. of
Appellee, 14 (citing to January 2007 hearing)).
Those proceedings are irrelevant. They do not shed light on the meaning of the
phrase - "to have the work done by a licensed third party" (see R. 55; 188:13; see also
R. 63 (letter from defendant stating that he was to hire a contractor to do the work)) - as
set forth in the actual agreement, particularly where Martin maintains the agreement did
not prohibit him from assisting with the work. (Br. of Appellant, Argument, Point II.B.)
Indeed, the subsequent proceedings show only that the trial court sought to construe the
agreement months after the plea hearing. That was improper for the following reasons.
First, the subsequent proceedings are not an adequate substitute for setting forth "a
full, detailed recitation of the requirements and conditions" of the agreement at the time
of the plea, as required by law. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4) (setting forth requirements
7

for plea-in-abeyance agreement); id_ at § 77-2a-l(l) (indicating conditions are "as set
forth" in the plea-in-abeyance agreement); see also Mora, 2003 UT App 117, U 19
(requiring ambiguities to be clarified at the plea hearing) (cite omitted); Bickley, 2002 UT
App 342, Tf 16 (recognizing that trial court should make sure parties understand terms
"before acting upon the [plea] agreement") (cite omitted). In other words, to the extent
the trial court used subsequent hearings in this case to clarify the original plea-inabeyance agreement, that would be improper unless the trial court expressly afforded the
defendant a meaningful opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea. An after-the-fact
interpretation would not adequately protect a defendant who has already waived
constitutional rights to plead guilty to a criminal offense. See, e.g.. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at
1312 (requiring trial court to ensure constitutional requirements are met when the plea
agreement is entered); Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523 (stating ambiguities in the agreement
"must be read against the government"; the rationale for this requirement is that the
agreement must adequately warn the defendant of the consequences of the plea).
Second, to the extent the trial court's subsequent hearings clarified the agreement,
any clarification was required to be against the government and in favor of the defendant.
See, e.g., Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523; Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d at 989; InreAltro, 180
F.3d at 375. Since the trial court failed to construe the agreement in that fashion, it erred.
(See Br. of Appellant, Argument, Point II.B.(l)).
In the alternative, where the agreement needed clarification because it was
susceptible to differing interpretations by the parties, the agreement itself was in error.
See Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,ffif11-12 (reflecting that the State interpreted "total
8

victim restitution" to mean complete restitution, while defendant contended it meant
restitution for charged years). Indeed, the different interpretations support "no meeting of
the minds." Id_ at ^ 15 (recognizing no meeting of the minds as to what "total victim
restitution" meant) (citing inter alia, 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 31 (1991) ("Where
after the parties have apparently agreed to the terms of a contract, circumstances
disclosed a latent ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which one of the
parties meant one thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to the essence
of the supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract.") (footnote omitted)); (see
also Br. of Appellant, Argument, Point II.B.(2)). Thus, the matter may be "'corrected by
placing the parties in their original positions. As long as the defendant retains
constitutional protections, no harm need be suffered.'" Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^j 16
(cite omitted).
In short, in this case, the plea-in-abeyance agreement required Martin to do repair
work to his neighbor's yard and fence, and "to have the work done by a licensed third
party." (R. 55; 188:13). The agreement did not prohibit Martin from assisting with the
work. (See R. 55; 188:13). Rather, it provided a level of professionalism by requiring a
third-party licensed contractor, and it served to accommodate Ms. Randazzo so that she
would not have to interact directly with Martin. (See R. 188:13 (identifying animosity
between Martin and Ms. Randazzo)). In addition, since Martin used the third-party
contractor to do work, he was able to assist without being on Ms. Randazzo's property.
(See R. 9 (reflecting no-contact order); 188:13 (identifying animosity "with [Martin]
personally being there"); 55 (requiring licensed third party)).
9

In this case, Martin did the work in compliance with the agreement: he hired a
third-party licensed electrician "slash handyman," Evan Lee. (R. 197:47, 48, 51;
Defendant's Exhibits 5, 7). Martin assisted Lee when needed and was able to do so
without trespassing onto Ms. Randazzo's property; he poured concrete to secure the posts
and design of the fence. (R. 197:49-51, 52-53; also R. 197:32-33 (Poppleton saw Martin
working on corner end posts)). Also, while Martin acknowledged that Lee was not
always present, Lee did most of the work and was there "[t]he majority of the time." (R.
197:50, 55).
Based on the record, the trial court erred when it ruled that Martin violated the
terms and conditions of the agreement. (Compare R. 197:55-56 (trial court ruling); with
R. 55 (plea agreement)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4)(a) (requiring the plea
agreement to include "a full, detailed recitation" of requirements and conditions); Mora,
2003 UT App 117, If 19 (requiring ambiguities to be clarified at the plea hearing);
Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523 (construing ambiguities against the government). Thus, this
Court may order reinstatement of the agreement. In the alternative, it may allow the
parties to return to their pre-plea positions under Bickley, 2002 UT App 342.
CONCLUSION
Martin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling since he
was not in violation of the plea agreement. This Court may order reinstatement of the
agreement or it may order that the parties be returned to their pre-plea positions.
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